Abstract: Common law negligence claims persist in check fraud cases despite the Uniform Commercial Code's loss allocation provisions in Articles 3 and 4. Absent an explicit preemption provision, courts disagree as to whether, when, and to what extent the Code preempts these common law claims. As a result, the courts' varying analytical approaches to common law negligence claims often create seemingly conflicting results. This Note reviews the current loss allocation rules in check fraud scenarios and examines recent preemption case law. It argues in favor of the comprehensive rights and remedies analysis used by the majority of courts to determine the circumstances under which common law negligence claims should be allowed under the Code. It also makes recommendations for future Code revisions based on the recent case law. Finally, this Note suggests that the loss allocation scheme as presently constituted provides a latent benefit to the payment system by encouraging customers to move toward electronic payment.
Introduction
Delighted by the sudden success of his business but unable to keep up with operations himself, a small business owner hires an accountant to manage the company's finances.1 The owner's trust is misplaced, and the accountant embezzles hundreds of thousands of dollars from the business over the next several years.2 The owner neither reviews monthly bank statements nor audits the books, but hundreds of checks issued to the business were indorsed over to the accountant and deposited in his personal bank account without a second look from his bank. 
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A decedent's heirs hire an attorney to administer their loved one's estate.4 When the heirs call the bank to inquire about missing monthly statements, they are dismayed to learn that the funds are now with the estate administrator somewhere in the South Pacific.5 Although the administrator was not authorized to initiate transactions on the estate's account without a cosigner, the bank allowed him to do so several times. 6 An elderly gentleman receives a bank check in the mail along with a letter from an African prince and humanitarian asking for his help.7 Feeling skeptical, the gentleman asks a bank manager how long he should wait to ensure that the check will be honored.8 The bank manager informs him that the bank check is "as good as cash" and can be moved at any time without risk.9 Based on this information, the customer sends a wire transfer out of the country per his agreement with the African prince.10 Unfortunately, the check deposited to cover the wire is returned the same day by the payor bank because it was fraudulent.11
These and other similar scenarios play out each day in our payment system.12 Not surprisingly, check fraud scenarios create significant litigation involving loss allocation.13 Parties often disagree as to which 4 For an actual occurrence of this scenario and its potential repercussions, see Brannon v. BankTrust, Inc., 50 So. 3d 397, 399-400 (Ala. 2010) (discussing liability for losses where an attorney hired to assist with estate administration initiated several transactions payable to his law firm which were honored by the bank notwithstanding the fact that he was not authorized to make transactions against the estate's account).
5 See id. 6 See id. 7 For an actual occurrence of this scenario and its potential repercussions, see Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188-89 (Mont. 2006) (discussing liability for losses where a customer received solicitation from a purported humanitarian asking for help with the purchase of farming equipment for a needy foreign village). A bank check, also known as a bank draft, is a check "where the payment is guaranteed to be available by [ 13 See Advance Dental Care, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 816 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270-71 (D. Md. 2011) (discussing liability for fraud losses where an office manager signed check pay-law controls the parties' rights, duties, and liabilities.14 On the one hand, Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code set out a system of rights and liabilities for check fraud in which unavoidable losses are allocated to the banks, whereas avoidable losses are generally allocated to the "best loss avoider."15 As a practical matter, the best loss avoider is generally the customer.16 Furthermore, even where other Code provisions do not allocate loss to the customer, the Code also provides a strict statute of limitations for claims that may preclude a customer from recovery. 17 Thus, customer-plaintiffs may wish to advance common law claims such as negligence to avoid these limitations.18 But courts disagree about whether and to what extent common law negligence claims are valid under the Code.19 And to extent that courts allow common law negligence claims, they disagree as to the appropriate analytical preemption test.20 For example, some courts ask whether the Code provides a comprehensive set of rights and remedies to the parties in the dispute.21 Other courts ask whether the underlying factual circum- 14 See Jenkins, supra note 13, at 499; see also Allfirst Bank, 905 A.2d at 377 (illustrating disagreement over whether UCC or common law applies in check fraud scenarios); C-Wood Lumber Co. v 281-82. stances fall within the Code's scope of coverage.22 And at least one jurisdiction employs a textual analysis of the Code's provisions to determine whether the Code's plain meaning preempts common law claims.23 Regardless of the chosen inquiry, common law negligence claims are occasionally permitted. 24 This Note advocates for the "comprehensive rights and remedies approach" to evaluating common law negligence claims in check fraud scenarios, but suggests revisions to the current Articles 3 and 4 scheme to address fairness issues identified by the courts.25 Part I discusses common forms of check fraud and explains the history and mechanics of the loss allocation scheme under Articles 3 and 4.26 Part II examines the courts' analyses of common law negligence claims under the Code for check fraud scenarios.27 Part III argues that common law negligence claims probably should not be allowed based on a strict reading of the Code.28 Recognizing the limited circumstances in which courts have allowed common law negligence claims-and the minimal impact they have had on predictability-however, Part III recommends revisions to the check fraud allocation scheme based on the results reached by courts, which better reflect the broader goal of consumer protection articulated in payment systems generally.29 Finally, Part III suggests that the check fraud loss allocation scheme provides a latent benefit to the payment system as a whole by encouraging customers to move toward electronic payments.30 Check fraud has been a widespread and widely known phenomenon since the beginning of negotiable instruments law.31 In many ways, check fraud is easier to commit today than ever before: automated check processing systems have rendered physical review of checks a thing of the past, and simple desktop publishing software has made it easier than ever to make a convincing forgery at home.32 Despite the prevalence of check fraud, however, the United States remains tied to the check as a significant payment method for consumers and businesses alike.33 In 2010, for example, U.S. businesses and consumers used more than 8 billion checks to pay for everything from rent and employee wages to the bus costs for school field trips.34 Each check cost approximately 43 cents to process, for a total cost of $3.4 billion. This Section explains the check collection process and how it facilitates check fraud.39 It also discusses how alterations and forgeries are commonly used to commit check fraud.40
Fraud Based on the Check Collection Process
The check collection process often contributes to check fraud.41 This process has been historically paper based and has essentially followed the check.42 The person writing the check, known as the "drawer," gives the check to the beneficiary, who in turn presents it to his or her bank to begin the collection process.43 The beneficiary's bank, known as the "depositary bank," then forwards the check's information to the drawer's bank, known as the "payor bank."44 The payor bank receives the information and sends funds to the depositary bank as indicated on the check.45 Upon receiving the funds, the depositary bank applies them to the beneficiary's account to complete the payment.46 44 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 456; see also U.C.C. § 4-105(2) ("'Depositary bank' means the first bank to take an item even though it is also the payor bank, unless the item is presented for immediate payment over the counter."); id. § 4-105(3) ("'Payor bank' means a bank that is the drawee of a draft.").
45 See Rogers, supra note 41, at 456-57. 46 See id. at 456. The inefficiency of the system is apparent when it is considered in reference to electronic payment systems. See id. With electronic transfers, the originator gives instructions for payment to its own bank, which sends the funds to the beneficiary's bank, which in turn applies the funds to the beneficiary's account. See id. This process avoids the burdensome and inefficient back-and-forth required by the paper check collection process. See id.; supra notes 43--45 and accompanying text (describing the paper check collection process).
Nevertheless, the 2003 Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21 Act), provided the legislative stamp of approval for electronic presentment.47 Today, banks often remove a physical check from circulation and electronically transmit either an image of the check or the check's "MICR" information to the payor bank for collection.48 This image becomes the legal equivalent of the paper check and can be used the same way as the original check.49 Thus, electronic presentment provides a time-and cost-saving alternative to paper-based collection.50
Although electronic presentment is much faster than the paperbased presentment process that preceded it, the collection process is not instantaneous and the so-called "check float" phenomenon remains.51 Because of funds availability rules, there are often several days between the date of deposit and the date that funds are actually received 50 See Mucklestone, supra note 42, at 40. Despite the conception of the Check 21 Act prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the attacks further highlighted the paper-based check system's vulnerability because air freight was grounded for several days after the attacks, grinding the check system to a halt. See Bauer & Gerdes, supra note 35, at 1. In the days following the 9/11 attacks, "Grounded checks peaked at a value of over $45 billion." Id. For more information on the intersection of the terrorist attacks and the financial community, see generally 88 Bd. by the depositary bank.52 Thus, the customer has access to the funds represented by the check before the check has affirmatively been honored by the payor bank.53 "Check kiting," a common type of check fraud, takes advantage of this float period by depositing a fraudulent check in one account, then drawing the funds during the float period and depositing them in another account.54 Float also underlies scams known as "Nigerian check fraud schemes," in which someone receives a check from a supposed humanitarian with instructions to deposit the check and wire a portion of the funds to another account as soon as the funds become available.55 The fraudster receives the wire and withdraws the funds immediately, leaving the check's recipient to bear the loss when the float period ends and the check is returned as fraudulent.56
The Code attempts to balance the benefits to customers of expedited funds availability with the potential risk for fraud created by float.57 The Code prescribes certain deadlines for banks to either credit a customer's account for a deposit or to pay or return checks presented for payment from a customer's account.58 But the bank also enjoys an unconditional right to charge back the customer's account if a deposited item is subsequently returned.59 This chargeback right is only lim- 56 See U.C.C. § 4-201(a) (2002) (indicating that the credit is provisional until the final settlement/funds are collected); id. § 4-202 (requiring a bank to timely return dishonored items in order for the bank to have presumptively exercised ordinary care in the return process); id. § 4-212(b) (indicating that the presenting bank can treat any item not received by the close of business on the third day following presentment as if it were dishonored by sending the drawer or indorser notice of the facts); id. § 4-214 (providing the right of chargeback to banks when provisional credit has been given to a customer, notwithstanding the fact that the customer may have taken out the funds already); see also Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 188-89 (describing this scheme); U.C.C. § 4-105(6) (describing a "presenting bank" as "a bank presenting an item except a payor bank").
57 Compare Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 (2013) (providing for the availability of funds before the check has cleared), with U.C.C. ited by the requirement that the bank must share liability for whatever losses were caused by its own delay in returning the item.60
Fraud on the Instrument a. Types of Fraud
At the broadest level, fraud on the check itself takes two forms: alteration and forgery.61 An alteration is an unauthorized change in a check that modifies or changes the maker's obligation or the payee's right to payment.62 This includes any unauthorized addition of words or numbers to a completed check, as well as any additions or changes to an incomplete check.63 Thus, an alteration occurs when a fraudster takes a legitimate check and changes important information, such as the amount or payee.64 For example, Business X writes a check to Landscaper for $150 to pay for monthly grounds maintenance and sends it to Landscaper in the mail.65 Usurper takes Landscaper's mail, check and all, and notices that there is enough blank space to the right of Landscaper's name and the amount to change the payment information to "Landscaper or Usurper, $150,000" using his home publishing software.66 Usurper makes the changes and brings the check to his bank for deposit.67 Alternatively, Business X's Bookkeeper may begin writing a check to Landscaper, inputting the amount, signing the check, and writing "Landscaper, February" in the Memo line-but leaving the Order line blank.68 Usurper, a janitor at Business X, takes the check from Bookkeeper's desk, writes in his name on the Order line, and cashes the check at his bank.69 The Code initially allocates losses from alterations to the depositary bank.70 Using the first illustration above, the unauthorized alteration would discharge Business X's obligation under the instrument except as according to its original terms ($150 to Landscaper).71 In the second example, though, payment to Usurper was, effectively, part of the check's original terms since Bookkeeper left the Order line blank.72 Thus, the check would be enforceable against Business X according to the completed terms so long as Bank took the item for value, in good faith, and without notice of the alteration. 73 Forgery comes in many more flavors than alteration, but it has two main varieties.74 In the first, the fraudster forges the drawer's signature on a check payable from the drawer's account.75 For instance, assume that Usurper, a janitor at Business X, steals a check from Bookkeeper's desk, marks it "Payable to the Order of Usurper, $4,500.00," and forges Bookkeeper's authorizing signature on the signature line.76 Usurper has forged the drawer's signature on the check.77 In the second type of forgery, the fraudster forges the beneficiary's indorsement on a check written by the drawer and signs it over to himself.78 For example, assume that Usurper steals a check from Bookkeeper's desk bearing Bookkeeper's authorizing signature and made payable to Landscaper.79 If Usurper signs on behalf of Landscaper to transfer the check to himself and then presents the check for deposit at his own bank, he has forged the beneficiary's indorsement. 80 In either case, the Code initially places the loss on the banks because the items presented are not properly payable.81 The Code authorizes the bank to pay only items which are properly payable.82 If the item is not authorized, or if the bank does not pay it in accordance with any agreements between itself and its customer, the item is not properly payable.83 In the forged indorsement scenario, the depositary bank takes the loss.84 In the forged drawer signature scenario, the payor bank takes the loss.85 Absent a defense, then, the Code allocates unavoidable forgery losses among the payment system providers, rather than its users.86
b. Bank Defenses to Forgery and Alteration
Nevertheless, there are several defenses that allow banks to shift all or part of the losses from forgery and alteration to each other or to customers.87 As between the banks, the payor bank (a "transferee" for purposes of the presentment warranty) may be able to assert a breach of presentment warranty against the bank that transferred the check to it for payment (a "transferor," typically the depositary bank).88 The presentment warranty requires the payor bank to show that the transferor had actual knowledge that the check was a forgery.89 Because the payor bank must prove that the depository bank had actual knowledgerather than merely notice-the presentment warranty typically leaves the loss with the payor bank rather than the depositary bank.90
Although a payor bank may not be successful under a presentment warranty, the payor bank can almost always shift the loss from a forged indorsement or alteration to the depositary bank because of the Code's transfer warranty.91 Where multiple banks form a chain of transfer, each bank in the chain makes a transfer warranty to each subsequent bank in the chain.92 Each transferee warrants that it was entitled to enforce the check and that there were no alterations on it.93 Because most forged or altered checks are not enforceable, the payor bank can almost always shift the loss from a forged indorsement or alteration to the depositary bank. 94 In the event that the loss falls on the payor bank, several additional defenses provide the means by which the bank may often transfer the risk of loss to its customer.95 First, the bank is not liable for a forgery or alteration where the customer's failure to exercise ordinary care "substantially contributed" to the alteration or forgery and the bank paid the check or took it for value or collection in good faith.96 This de- fense, known as the "holder in due course" rule, is available regardless of whether the bank also acted negligently.97 This makes sense because, as between the bank and the customer, the customer was in the better position to have prevented the loss.98
A second defense deals with situations in which fraud is ongoing.99 If a customer receives bank statements, the customer must notify the bank of any unauthorized payments within thirty days.100 If the customer fails to notify the bank, it loses its right to recover for any subsequent fraudulent items made by the same fraudster.101 Here again, the bank may raise the defense regardless of its own negligence in handling the item.102 Assume that Usurper began forging checks from Business X's account in January, with the first fraudulent item appearing on the statement dated January 31.103 Bookkeeper goes on vacation, leaving the unopened statement on her desk until March 13.104 Usurper, meanwhile, has negotiated seven more checks, totaling $10,000.105 Although Bookkeeper notifies the bank upon opening the statements on March 13, Business X's bank will only be liable for the first check; the rest are subject to the ongoing fraud defense. 100 See id. The customer has a duty to report any items bearing forged drawer signatures within thirty days of the receipt of the statement on which they appear. See id. If the fraud is continuous, the customer is precluded from asserting the forgery for all but the items passed within the thirty days after the receipt of the statement revealing the first fraudulent item. See id. Regardless of whether the forgery is ongoing or an isolated event, the customer has one year from the date of the statement showing the forged item in which to report the loss to the bank. See id.
101 See id. This is true so long as the bank paid the item or items in good faith. See id. In addition, the bank must prove that it suffered a loss because of the customer's failure to notify it in situations where the signature on the item was unauthorized or there was an alteration on the item. as a policy matter because the customer could easily have avoided the subsequent losses by simply reviewing the bank statement and alerting the bank to the fraud.107 Third, the bank may assert a statute of limitations defense if the customer does not discover and report an unauthorized signature or alteration within one year of its appearance on a bank statement.108 Assume that Usurper forges Bookkeeper's signature on a check drawn from Business X's account in January, but instead of opening the bank statements sent to Business X, Bookkeeper merely puts them in a desk drawer for the auditors.109 When the audit team arrives the following March and discovers the fraud, Business X's bank has a complete defense from liability because Business X waited more than a year to report the fraud.110
Fourth, the Code places liability on the customer instead of the bank where the customer was duped into making payments to a fictitious payee or to an imposter.111 In the fictitious payee scenario, a customer is tricked into writing a check to satisfy a debt that is not actually owed. own side business, Business Y, and includes a fraudulent invoice to back up the payment.123 After Bookkeeper signs the check, Usurper indorses it over to himself and cashes it at Business X's bank.124 Although a reasonable person might think it highly unlikely that a business would sign a large check over to an individual, Business X will still take the loss because an employer is in the best position to avoid this type of loss through employee supervision and oversight.125
In sum, the Code begins with the premise that the bank takes the loss for fraudulent or altered items, and then provides a series of defenses for the bank to use to recover part or all of the loss.126 This recovery can come from other banks in the form of presentment or transfer warranties.127 In addition, Banks may recover from customers by exercising defenses for comparative negligence, the holder in due course provision, failure to review bank statements, statute of limitations, fictitious payee liability, or the employer negligence provision.128
B. The Intersection of Articles 3 and 4 and Common Law Negligence
Commentators level significant criticism at the loss allocation provisions in Articles 3 and 4.129 This criticism stems in large part from the fact that the revised loss allocation system shifted certain losses from the banking system to the customers who use it, regardless of whether the rules, as applied, result in arguably unfair outcomes.130 After the revisions, banks have no duty to inspect items received for deposit, despite prior case law in certain jurisdictions that held otherwise and often allowed customers to recover losses from the banks.131
Additionally, ordinary care is the post-revision standard with which banks must comply when processing checks, but it requires only that banks "[observe] reasonable commercial standards prevailing in the area in which the [bank] is located, with respect to [the banking industry generally]," leading one commentator to summarize the rule as requiring banks to simply do "whatever anyone else is doing."132 This is viewed as problematic because banks are free to lower the level of security provided in the check processing system without bearing additional liability for fraudulent checks.133
Comparing consumer debit and credit card fraud loss allocation rules are particularly customer friendly.135 If a fraudster uses a customer's card number to initiate fraudulent transactions but the customer did not lose the debit or credit card, the customer's liability for those losses is capped at $50, provided that the customer reports the loss within sixty days of the statement showing the transactions.136 If the fraud occurred because the customer lost the debit or credit card, a consumer's liability ranges between $0 and $500, again provided that the customer notifies the bank of the fraud within sixty days of the statement showing the transactions.137 Like the Articles 3 and 4 scheme, these approaches maintain the customer's duty to review account statements.138 Unlike Articles 3 and 4, however, the loss allocation scheme for debit and credit cardbased fraud places a cap on liability when the customer notifies the bank of the theft.139
The Code's loss allocation for fraudulent electronic transfers is likewise more balanced.140 Article 4A covers electronic funds transfers by wire, ACH, and credit or debit cards.141 Article 4A provides that the bank will take the loss for fraudulent electronic payments unless the parties have agreed upon the use of a commercially reasonable security procedure to authenticate the customer's payment orders, and the bank proves that it complied with the security procedure and any other written agreement or customer instructions in accepting the payment order and that it acted in good faith. 142 Commercial reasonableness requires that the security procedure reflect the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank; the circumstances of the customer known to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the bank; alternative security procedures offered to but declined by the customer; and security procedures in general use by customers and banks similarly situated.143 Because it has an objective, industry-wide element and a subjective, customer-specific element, this standard is much stricter than the "what everyone else is doing" standard that defines ordinary care for check fraud liability purposes.144 , http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf. These guidelines recommend that security procedures include something that a user knows, something that a user is, and something that a user has. See id. A password and an ATM PIN are common examples of something that a user knows which will verify his or her identity. See id. An ATM card and a security token are common examples of something that a user has to verify his or her identity. See id. A security token is a small device, often attached to a keychain, that displays a code that the user must input into the online payment system to verify a transaction. See id. The code changes at set intervals, usually one minute. See id. These items are combined with something unique to the user, such as the user's IP address, fingerprint, or voice. See id. Successfully initiating a fraudulent transaction in a system that incorporates all of these features is much more difficult than cashing a fraudulent paper check with a forged signature on it, especially now that checks are processed electronically. See id.
144 See U.C.C. § 4A-202; Overby, supra note 15, at 380. It bears mentioning that if the bank proves that its security procedures were commercially reasonable, the customer will take the loss unless the customer can prove that the perpetrator was not someone entrusted with duties to act for the customer relating to payment orders or the security pro-
II. Courts Take Different Approaches to Common Law Negligence
This Part begins by discussing the uncertain status of common law negligence claims under the Uniform Commercial Code.145 It then discusses the various interpretive approaches that courts use to determine whether negligence claims should be preempted by the Code's provisions.146
A. Common Law Negligence Under the Code
Customers who are victims of fraudulent transactions often pursue common law causes of action to avoid the statute of limitations, the customer's duty to review statements, or the bank's right of chargeback as provided by the Code.147 Because these plaintiffs are often sympathetic, there is a strong temptation for courts to allow these claims when viewed in the context of Articles 3 and 4's history and pro-bank image.148
But the Code is not clear as to whether and under what contexts common law claims should be allowed in check fraud scenarios because Articles 3 and 4 have no explicit preemption provision.149 Some view section 3-406 as explicitly displacing common law negligence actions because it requires an analysis substantially similar to that of common law comparative negligence.150 In this view, a common law action that cedure, and that he or she did not obtain access to transmitting facilities of the customer or information facilitating a breach of the security procedure from a source controlled by the customer. See U.C.C. § 4A-202. This means that, like in check fraud liability, unavoidable losses in the payment system are borne by the banks, but avoidable losses (like employee embezzlement or weak Internet security at a customer's office that allows hackers to access the banking system) will be borne by the party best able to have prevented the loss. was forced to cash in his pension account and take out a second mortgage to satisfy a debt owed to his bank from the operation of a chargeback provision); Overby, supra note 15, at 383 (noting that elderly and infirm banking customers are prime victims for check fraud).
149 Compare U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (providing a general back door for the admittance of common law claims), and Overby, supra note 15, at 391 (observing that "[a]rticles 3 and 4 contain no express 'displacement' provision"), with U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (providing that, unless explicitly incorporated, common law claims should not be allowed under Article 4A).
150 See U.C.C. § 3-406 (precluding individuals whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to an alteration or forgery from asserting the fraud against a per-imposes losses on the drawer would be displaced by the statutory language in section 3-406 because it 3-406 creates a preemption, rather than an independent cause of action.151 Nevertheless, section 3-406 does not explicitly displace common law negligence actions.152
Without an explicit displacement provision, common law negligence actions are often analyzed under the Code's general preemption provision in section 1-103.153 Section 1-103(b) provides that " [u] nless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity . . . supplement its provisions."154 The official comments caution that:
The text of each section should be read in the light of the purposes and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Uniform Commercial Code as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly . . . in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.155
Further, the official comments clarify that "while principles of common law and equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect."156 As a general matter, then, the Code is intended to preempt any common law claim that is "inconsistent with either its provisions or its purposes and policies."157
The Code identifies its three main policy objectives in section 1-103(a).158 First, the Code attempts to simplify, clarify and modernize son who pays the instrument or takes it for value or collection in good faith to the extent that their negligence contributed to the losses, and establishing that the bank has the burden of proving that the customer failed to exercise ordinary care); Robert A. Hillman the law governing commercial transactions.159 Second, the Code seeks to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.160 Third, the Code aims to make the law uniform among the various jurisdictions in the areas it covers.161 To achieve these goals, the Code advocates for liberal construction and application of its provisions wherever they apply.162 The official comments also note that the Code is "the primary source of commercial law rules in the areas that it governs, and its rules represent choices made by its drafters and the enacting legislatures about the appropriate policies to be furthered in the transactions it covers."163 Other important policies specific to Articles 3 and 4 include promoting the transferability of instruments and the use of checks, placing the loss on the best risk bearer, and placing the loss on the party best able to have prevented the harm. 164 Basing preemption analysis in policy is particularly difficult because check fraud scenarios often implicate competing policy objectives.165 For example, disallowing common law negligence claims may promote uniformity of the law among jurisdictions by providing a reliable and predictable outcome for check fraud situations.166 But allowing those common law claims supports the transferability of instruments because the transferee is protected from bearing the ultimate loss if it can recover from the drawer.167 Allowing such claims also supports placing the loss with the negligent party, thereby encouraging drawers to be more vigilant in their efforts to deter fraud. 168 Common law negligence claims brought by drawers against depositary banks highlight the problem with conflicting policies in the common law claim preemption analysis.169 For example, assume that Employee, who verifies and tracks check payment information for Business X, is forging Bookkeeper's authorizing signature on fraudulent checks in large amounts payable to Employee.170 Permitting Business X to bring a negligence claim against Employee's bank could undermine the Code's provisions by shifting the risk of loss for employee embezzlement from Business X onto the depositary bank and runs counter to the Code's policy of promoting uniformity and predictability across jurisdictions.171 Section 3-405 would place the loss on Business X over Business X's bank (the payor bank), suggesting that the Code intends to leave the risk of loss in employee embezzlement situations on the employer.172 But section 3-405 only applies to the payor bank, and the Code recognizes that all banks have a duty to exercise ordinary care in section 4-103.173 Taken together, these provisions could suggest that the drawer's common law negligence claim against the depositary bank might be allowed, even if the negligence claim against the payor bank is preempted.174 This result would support the Code's policy of promoting the transferability of instruments.175
The rules of the section are applied only to collecting banks. Payor banks always have the problem of making proper payment of an item; whether such payment is proper should be based upon all of the rules of Articles 3 and 4 and all of the facts of any particular case, and should not be dependent exclusively upon instructions from or an agreement with a person presenting the item.
Id. § 4-203 cmt.
174 See U.C.C. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity . . . supplement its provisions."); id. § 3-405 (placing the risk of loss on employers in cases of employee embezzlement); id. § 4-103 (requiring banks to exercise ordinary care); Hillman 1991, supra note 150, at S14-33. Of course, the depositary bank could take advantage of the holder in due course doctrine. See U.C.C. § 3-418; supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (describing this defense and indicating that it is available even where a bank acts negligently). A holder in due course is someone who took an instrument in good faith and for value or who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment or acceptance of it. U.C.C. § 3-418(c).
175 See Hillman 1985 , supra note 150, at 14-52.
B. Courts Interpret the Code in Different Ways
Absent clear guidance, courts have come to differing conclusions regarding the status of negligence claims under the Code.176 Courts generally agree that common law negligence claims are displaced where allowing them would thwart the purposes of the Code.177 But they articulate a variety of tests to determine whether a common law claim thwarts the purposes of the Code and often reach different results after applying them.178 Generally speaking, it appears that courts allow common law negligence claims when the particular facts of the case justify reaching beyond the Code to maintain simple fairness in the results, especially when the bank is engaged in poor business practices.179 This Section discusses these varying approaches and their results in check fraud cases since the 1990 amendments.180
The majority of courts use the comprehensive rights and remedies test to determine whether a common law claim has been displaced by the Code.181 The courts ask whether allowing the common law claims (1) the Code provides a comprehensive remedial scheme and (2) reliance on the common law would undermine the purposes of the Code."). Minnesota, Colorado, Tennessee, Georgia, and Ohio have also would "create rights, duties, and liabilities inconsistent with those set forth in the [provisions of the UCC]."182 For instance, in 1999 in Sebastian v. D&S Express, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey considered a common law negligence action based on the company's former president making checks payable to fictitious payees and then cashing them with the same teller at the defendant bank over the course of four years.183 Although the plaintiff argued that the bank should have been aware of the fraud because of its duration and the fact that the same teller cashed the checks every time, the court held that the common law negligence claim was preempted because the UCC provision at issue, section 3-404, applied a standard very similar to the common law negligence standard.184 Section 3-404 essentially codifies comparative negligence, because it provides that when a bank taking a check for value or collection fails to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the check and the failure substantially contributes to the loss resulting from paying the check, the person bearing the loss may recover from the bank to the extent the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.185 This duplication led the court to conclude that the Code covered the entire field of available legal theories.186 Thus, the common law claim was preempted because the Code provided a comprehensive remedy. 187 Nevertheless, in applying the comprehensive rights and remedies test, at least one jurisdiction has recognized a carve-out for situations in which a special relationship existed between the parties.188 For exam-ple, in 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey adopted this approach in In re Clear Advantage Title.189 A staff attorney and title examiner at Clear Advantage Title was creating payments for fictitious loans with the defendant bank, then indorsing checks on behalf of the company and asking for treasurer's checks in the same amount payable to personal creditors such as his children's private school and a jeweler.190 Typically, the bank would not have been liable for the loss under the Code because the staff attorney was an employee with responsibility for checks.191 Importantly, though, the deposit agreement between Clear Advantage and the bank established that only account signers would be able to make withdrawals, including through checks, from the account.192 And though the staff attorney was not an account signer, the bank allowed him to obtain over $425,000 from the scheme.193 As a result, the court held that the deposit agreement reflected the type of contractual relationship that created a duty which existed independent of the Code and required the bank to inquire of the employee before allowing him to withdraw funds from the corporate account. Hughes, the Montana Supreme Court used a narrow interpretation of the facts to show that the claim arose outside the bounds of the Code.198 A customer brought a fraudulent bank check to his bank for deposit and inquired as to how long it would take for the funds to be collected.199 A bank officer replied that the bank check was the "same as cash" and he could therefore use the funds however he wished at any time. 200 He initiated a payment out of the account using those funds, and the check was subsequently returned as fraudulent.201 The customer brought a negligence claim against the bank based on the bank officer's representations about the check. 202 The court held that the negligence claim was not preempted by the Code, reasoning that the plaintiff's claims encompassed both the check's processing and the bank's communication to him about that process.203 Because communications between the bank and its customer are not specifically addressed by the UCC, common law governed the legal rights and responsibilities that applied to the bank's representations to the plaintiff, upon which he relied to his detriment. 204 In contrast, in 2012 in Notredan, LLC v. Old Republic Exchange Facilitator Co., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee used the scope test broadly to invalidate a common law negligence claim.205 There, the plaintiff had hired Old Republic to assist with a real estate transaction.206 Old Republic received a check payable to the plaintiff but not indorsed.207 Undaunted, the Old Republic employee deposited the check into a trust account, taking a portion of the money out as a fee.208 Notredan brought a negligence action against Old Republic's bank for breaching its duty by allowing deposit of an unindorsed item.209 The court held that the negligence claim was preempted by the Code because it "embod[ies] a delicately balanced statutory scheme governing the endorsement, negotiation, collection, and payment of checks."210 Because this dispute dealt with the in-dorsement and payment of checks, the Code provided all available loss allocation rules. 211 Courts have also created conflicting case law based on the Code's statutory language.212 Connecticut courts assume that if the state legislature had intended for the Code to preempt common law claims, it would have made that explicit in the statutory language.213 In contrast, the U.S. District Court for the District of Ohio has held that common law claims were preempted because statutory provisions such as those in the Code should govern to the exclusion of prior, non-statutory law, unless there is a clear legislative intention that the statutory provisions are merely cumulative.214
In general, courts seem to allow common law negligence claims when the specific facts of the case and simple fairness justify placing liability in a way that is inconsistent with the Code-particularly where banks engage in poor business practices.215 Common law negligence claims were allowed where the bank opened an account without meeting the client or receiving proper documentation;216 where the bank allowed a non-signer to initiate transactions on accounts;217 where the bank failed to make an inquiry before depositing a check payable to the bank into a customer's account;218 and where the bank's employees made misstatements regarding the check collection process upon which the customers subsequently relied.219 Though courts arrive at these results using different preemption tests, results that appear anomalous upon initial consideration can be systematized using this rubric.220
III. Yielding to the Code: Why the UCC Should Preempt Common Law Negligence Claims
This Part argues that a strict reading of the Code should require that common law negligence claims be preempted by the Code.221 Given this reality, and because it preempts virtually all common law claims, the comprehensive rights and remedies test applied by the majority of courts is the best preemption test from a strictly legal stand-point.222 On the one hand, this is sensible because loss allocation rules protect the banking industry from additional liability due to federal regulation and allow banks to take advantage of cost-saving technology.223 Nevertheless, the drafters should consider whether there are more equitable ways to allocate check fraud losses during the next revision cycle because many courts have had difficulty applying these rules. 224 Until then, banking customers should consider pursuing electronic payment methods as an alternative to payment by check because electronic payments are safer, and the rules governing loss allocation for these payments are more equitable than those governing check fraud loss allocation.225
A. Common Law Negligence Claims Generally Should Not Be Allowed Under a Fair Reading of the Code
In general, allowing common law negligence claims in check fraud cases arguably contradicts a fair reading of the Code.226 Allowing common law claims conflicts with section 1-103 because common law claims undermine the Code's predictability and consistency. 227 In fact, in revising section 1-103, the drafters specifically broadened its language to enhance its preemptive effect.228 They did not want courts to allow the Code's purposes and policies to be frustrated by an unduly narrow reading of the preemption provision that asked only whether the text of the statutes specifically preempted or contradicted the Code's scheme.229 Instead, they intended the Code to preempt the common law wherever a common law claim would conflict with the Code's enu-merated purposes and policies.230 Allowing common law negligence claims in check fraud cases undermines the Code's goal of creating predictable outcomes by opening the door to highly variable tort damages. 231 At the same time, the benefits of enhancing the negotiability of instruments by allowing common law negligence claims are less obvious.232 On balance, then, the Code's overarching policies of predictability, consistency, and comprehensive coverage of commercial disputes are better served by a broad reading of the Code's applicability. 233 Nevertheless, the case law highlights some of the imperfections with the loss allocation scheme of Articles 3 and 4. 234 The view of the negligence remedy as a safety valve for unfair results may explain why Articles 3 and 4 do not include a provision specifically precluding common law negligence claims even after two revisions. 235 The drafting committee may have seen the value in maintaining common law negligence claims as a release for situations when fairness considerationsthe absence of a preemption provision may have been nothing more than a happy accident.237
Article 4A, dealing with electronic payments, also supports a strict preemption reading.238 Article 4A explains that, although competing interests are commonplace within funds transfer scenarios, those competing interests were necessarily considered and balanced during the drafting process.239 As such, the resulting rules reflect a balance of those interests and are "intended to be the exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any situation covered by . . . [Article 4A]."240 For this reason, resorting to common law claims is generally not appropriate in cases involving electronic funds transfers.241 If the Code generally rejects common law claims for electronic payments, an extension of this policy to payments made by check is highly reasonable.242
Through this lens, the comprehensive rights and remedies test is the best preemption test for courts to use to determine whether com- Funds transfers involve competing interests . . . . [which] were represented in the drafting process and . . . . [were] thoroughly considered. The rules that emerged represent a careful and delicate balancing of those interests and are intended to be the exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any situation covered by particular provisions of this Article. Consequently, resort to principles of law or equity outside of Article 4A is not appropriate to create rights, duties and liabilities inconsistent with those stated in this Article.
Id.
239 mon law negligence claims should be allowed in check fraud scenarios.243 It reads the Code's applicability broadly and preempts virtually all common law negligence claims, consistent with the policy imperatives and official comments in section 1-103 and Article 4A's approach. 244 At the same time, it preserves an opening for common law claims in the rare instance where the public policy of incentivizing good business practices outweighs the Code's policy goals.245 And because these cases are so rare, allowing common law negligence claims in these limited instances has very little negative impact on predictability or parties' rights because these decisions are strongly tied to the specific set of factual circumstances presented in each case.246
B. The Loss Allocation Scheme Provides Latent Benefits
It is unlikely that the loss allocation rules as presently constituted are driven by a desire to protect the banking lobby at the expense of its customers.247 As prominent Code scholar Grant Gilmore satirically noted, "[l]uncheon at the Bankers' Club is not given over to devising ways and means of hoisting the poor customer each day a little higher on his own petard."248 Rather, the loss allocation scheme reflects the practical difficulties of banks in maintaining the paper check payment system on which their customers rely. 249 The bank's absolute right of chargeback protects banks from liability that would otherwise result from the intersection of check float and expedited funds availability.250 Prior to the Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC, banks would place a hold on a customer's account for the amount of a deposited check until the funds affirmatively came in.251 Now, banks must make funds from check deposits available long before the money has actually arrived at the depositary bank. 252 Where expedited funds availability in Regulation CC removed the bank's self-protection method of placing funds on hold until they were collected, the absolute right of chargeback now protects banks from the dangers inherent to check float.253 And so long as the customer is responsible about taking checks from reliable sources and maintaining sufficient funds in the account to cover a chargeback until a check clears, the provision will almost never become a problem for the customer. 254 The Code's revisions to the standard of ordinary care also reflect a realistic balance between the bank's interests in economic efficiency and the customer's interest in maintaining a check-based payment system. 255 Checks are the most expensive form of payment from a processing standpoint, but the country's continued reliance on the paper check payment system renders a strong push toward electronic payments unreasonable, even though such a move could save the banking industry billions of dollars.256 For example, the Check 21 Act, which provides for federal approval of electronic presentment, has resulted in significant savings and reduced the processing cost per check to less than one third of its pre-electronic presentment cost. 257 The drafters likely removed the court-created sight review requirement from the standard of ordinary care so that the banks would not incur liability as a result of making the economically rational choice to convert to electronic presentment, especially after the passage of the Check 21 Act.258 This result is consistent with good policy because it reduces the costs that are ultimately passed on to bank customers and reflects the Code's desire to grow and change in response to new commercial and technological developments. 259 Although preemption should be the general rule for common law negligence claims in check fraud cases, the drafters should consider whether there are more equitable ways to allocate check fraud losses during the next revision cycle because the rules as presently constituted are unclear and contentious. 260 As an initial matter, the drafters should include an explicit statement either precluding common law negligence actions in check fraud scenarios, or declaring the circumstances under which a common law negligence action is available under Articles 3 and 4.261 This would end the uncertainty inherent in a policybased analysis under section 1-103(b).262
In addition, the drafters should consider providing a separate set of rules for businesses than for individual consumers. 263 The Code and other laws already provide separate rules for consumers and businesses in other contexts. 264 The current loss allocation structure works well in the business context because it best reflects the policy of placing the risk of loss on the best risk avoider, especially because a significant proportion of check fraud scenarios in the business context are perpetrated by employees.265 Employee embezzlement is easier for the employer to prevent through oversight and other internal controls than for the bank to prevent through the check clearing system, and the current loss allocation scheme is well-suited to address these types of situations by assigning the risk of loss on the employer. 266 For individual consumers, however, the Code should place the risk of loss on the bank, subject only to the current comparative negligence rule.267 Under this paradigm, the Code would still allow a customer's failure to review bank statements to be a factor in the negligence analysis. 268 This resulting system would best reflect the overarching policy of consumer protection evidenced by other areas of payment law, while still holding the customer accountable for avoidable losses.269
For both business and consumer customers, the Code should provide a new provision assigning the risk of loss to the bank wherever customers rely on representations by bank employees about the check clearing process and that reliance leads to customer losses.270 Absent such an inquiry into funds availability, a customer should bear the risk of loss for sending out funds during the float period because float is such a well-known phenomenon and so many customers take advantage of it.271 But a customer who relies on a bank for information regarding the check clearing process before initiating a payment based on deposited funds acts both reasonably and responsibly.272 Furthermore, Nigerian check fraud schemes are so well-documented that a customer's question about funds availability in connection with an outgoing wire or other payment should cause alarms to sound in any bank employee's mind. 273 Simply put, banks should be held accountable for information provided to customers about the bank's own services. 274 Whereas businesses are in the best position to prevent employee fraud through oversight, banks are in the best position to prevent fraud that takes advantage of check float when a customer inquires about funds availability, because the bank knows the check clearing process and likely has substantial knowledge about typical fraud schemes. 275 Simple fairness requires that this loophole be closed. 276 Until Articles 3 and 4 are revised, though, the loss allocation scheme may be beneficial because it incentivizes bank customers to move away from payment by check.277 Whereas bank accounts may not be optional in today's society, payment by check is optional.278 Payments by wire transfer, ACH, or credit or debit cards benefit banks and their customers because they are easy and cost-efficient. 279 The banking customer can easily pay with these methods at a point of sale, from his or her home or office computer, or even from a mobile phone.280 Banks benefit because electronic transactions are far less expensive: a debit card transaction, for instance, costs thirty-five cents less to process than a check for the same amount.281 Converting just one out of every four check transactions into a debit card transaction in 2010 would have yielded over $700 million in savings.282 Furthermore, fraud committed by these payment methods fall under the more equitable rules in Regulation CC and Article 4A, providing benefits to both consumer and business banking customers.283 And because Article 4A's preemption language renders common law claims largely unavailable, both banks and customers can rely on the predictability of the rules. 284 Finally, whereas technological advances are making check fraud easier to commit and harder to detect, they are making electronic payments safer and also making fraud easier to catch.285 Standard security procedures incorporate a constantly evolving variety of knowledge and physically based security features to verify transactions.286 And because a banking customer can access account activity statements from any computer or mobile phone, fraud is far less likely to go unnoticed with reasonable diligence by the account holder, especially because users access transaction information through the same portal they use for payment processing services.287 Also, removing the physical check from circulation means that there is no way to fraudulently indorse a third party's payment or for an employee to alter the amount of a paycheck or expense reimbursement.288
Conclusion
Technology has changed the payment landscape over the last several decades, both for paper-based check payments and electronic funds transfers. A strict reading of the Code arguably requires that common law negligence claims in check fraud scenarios be preempted by the Code, making the comprehensive rights and remedies test the most accurate reflection of the Code's purposes and policies. At the same time, other tests and the inconsistent results of their applications suggest that the loss allocation rules are perceived as one-sided and that the drafters should consider whether there are more equitable ways to allocate check fraud losses during the next revision cycle. Nevertheless, the allocation provisions provide important protections for banks that make maintenance of the check payment systems possible. Until such revisions are made, banking customers should consider moving to electronic payments because they are safer, and the rules governing loss allocation for electronic payments are more equitable than those for check fraud loss allocation.
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